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Samenvatting
Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated
economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer’s
club e¢ciency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-
public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as purely public club
goods as polar cases. We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of
club e¢cient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies
with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class
of economies seems implausible.
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1 Club e¢ciency and Lindahl pricing
Lindahl equilibrium has played a central role in the general equilibrium theory
of public goods. This paper shows that Lindahl equilibrium can be assigned a central
role in economies with semi-public goods as well. We will provide a competitive basis
to Lindahl pricing within a club with a variable membership base which provides its
members with semi-public club goods.
The standard methodology in general equilibrium analysis to provide a competitive
basis to a price system is through limit core theory. It is well known that in these
economies Walrasian equilibrium allocations are the only allocations that cannot be
improved upon by any coalition of agents as the economy becomes large. More precisely,
Debreu and Scarf (1963) demonstrated that a Walrasian equilibrium allocation remains
in the core as the economy becomes larger and that it is the only allocation with this
property. In other words, no group of agents can improve upon an equilibrium allocation
and equilibrium allocations are the only ones with this property as the economy becomes
in…nitely large.
This fundamental Debreu-Scarf limit core theorem can be restated for a setting
with clubs with a variable membership pro…le. An allocation is club e¢cient if there
is no club with an arbitrary membership pro…le that can improve upon it. Schweizer
(1983) introduced this notion of club e¢ciency as a slight strengthening of this limit
core concept, allowing for arbitrary real number sizes of clubs. It can be shown that the
Debreu-Scarf limit core property, the Walrasian equilibrium concept, and club e¢ciency
are equivalent.1
The extension of the core-equivalence theorem to economies with public goods has
been widely discussed in the literature. Here we turn our attention to the equivalence
of the Lindahl equilibrium concept — an extension of the Walrasian equilibrium notion
to economies with public goods — and the limit core property, or equivalently, club
e¢ciency. With purely public goods the main problem is that such goods are not
replicated along with the rest of the economy. The resources foregone in their provision
are independent of the size of the economy or club. Utility levels can therefore be
increased by admitting new members and spreading the burden of the public good.
Schweizer (1983) provides Lindahlian price support of a club e¢cient allocation in an
1An indirect proof can be based on noting that Schweizer (1983) showed equivalence of the Walrasian
equilibrium concept and club e¢ciency. Debreu and Scarf (1963) showed equivalence of Walrasian
equilibria and the limit core. Hence, club e¢ciency, the Walrasian equilibrium concept, and the limit
core property are the same.3
economy with public goods, but must assume that some agents or endowments are given
in …xed numbers. The variable agents can escape taxation by the above logic and are,
therefore, free riders. The use of the exogenous club endowment for the funding of the
public goods amounts to the Henry George Theorem.
If there are no …xed numbers, it is still possible to de…ne the Lindahl equilibrium
concept. However, it has a meager competitive basis, for it is just one of many allocations
of economies with purely public goods that remain in the core or are club e¢cient
(Milleron, 1972).
In this paper we look at the provision of club goods with a semi-public nature.
Such goods are de…ned as commodities of an intermediate nature. It is assumed that
these commodities are provided through a club, and therefore are principally locally
collective. But their rivalry properties might be di¤erent from that of a purely locally
public good. In fact we will be able to handle commodities that range in nature from
purely public to purely private. For such intermediary club goods, member demands
are aggregated like public goods, but the club goods get replicated along with the
rest of the economy. Purely private goods and purely public goods are polar cases of
such club goods; individual demands are aggregated by summation and maximization,
respectively.
Our main theorem is that for certain club goods with a semi-public nature the
notions of club e¢ciency and Lindahl equilibrium remain equivalent. For this we extend
Schweizer’s (1983) equivalence theorem to a model in which the aggregation function
for the club goods has a certain speci…cation and certain properties. We also show that
it cannot be expected that our Lindahl equivalence result can be extended further to
more general speci…cations of the aggregation function.
The second section develops the model, Section 3 states and proves our equivalence
result, and Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion of the result, its relationship
to the literature, and its implications.
2 Clubs and club goods
In this section we introduce a model of a club consisting of a certain membership
base, an allocation of private goods consumed, and an allocation of so-called club goods,
which are provided collectively. In our theory we use a club as a replication device
discussed in the previous section.
We consider an economy with a …nite set of consumer types denoted by t =4
1;::: ;T. A vector n 2 RT
+ represents a pro…le of a coalition of economic agents,
comprising nt members of type t. A pro…le n 2 RT
+ forms the membership base of
a club. Throughout we assume that agents of the same type are treated equally, i.e.,
agents of the same type consume the same quantities of private as well as club goods.
This assumption enables us to discuss replication properly. In closed models such as the
standard model of a replicated pure exchange economy the equal treatment property
can be shown as a proposition (Debreu and Scarf, 1963).
We consider a situation with ` 2 N private goods. Agents of type t are endowed
with a commodity bundle wt 2 R`
+. It is assumed that wt > 0 for all t. Private
consumption of an agent of type t is now given by xt+wt 2 R` where xt denotes the net





There are m 2 N club goods. A club good is provided collectively by the club to
its members. A club good has a semi-public nature which can range from purely public
to purely private. Again assuming equal treatment, an agent of type t now consumes the
club goods at levels given by the vector yt 2 Rm
+. The total consumption plan for club




+ . Total consumption in a
club with membership base n 2 RT





The nature of the club goods is introduced through the production technology
used for their creation. The production technology is represented by the induced cost
function C : RmT
+ ! R`
+ which for every membership base n 2 RT
+ assigns to every total




+ a bundle of private goods C (y) 2 R`
+
that is used to create the club goods at these levels.2
We illustrate this de…nition by some examples. The club goods are purely pri-




, where the cost function e C : Rm
+ ! R`
+ represents a
standard private goods production technology converting the ` private good inputs into
m private good outputs. (This reduces the model to the standard setting of a pure
exchange economy.) The club goods are purely public if C (y) = K 2 R`
+, where
K is some …xed input vector. (This is the case studied by Schweizer, 1983.) Fi-
nally, there are many intermediate possibilities, giving the club goods a semi-public
nature. For example, if C(y) = e C(maxt=1;:::;T ntyt), where max 2 Rm
+ is de…ned by
maxi(y1;y2) = max(y1
i;y2
i) (i = 1;:::;m) and, as before, e C : Rm
+ ! R`
+ represents a
standard private goods production technology, we can interpret the club goods to be
based on a …xed infrastructure such as a network. The capacity of the network has to
2We may allow substitution of inputs by generalizing C to a correspondence.5
handle the peak demands, which in turn determines the construction costs.
Although these examples span a great variety of natures of club goods, ranging
from purely private to purely public, there is an important commonality, namely con-
vexity. In the pure public case, the induced cost function C is constant, which is
obviously convex. In the pure private and semi-public cases, C is induced by a private
goods cost function e C: If e C is convex, as is standard in neoclassical production theory
(excluding increasing returns to scale in production), then so is C in either case, as the
latter is the composition of e C and either summation (of private goods) or maximization
(of semi-public goods). The latter two operations are convex and the composition of
convex operations is convex.





a pro…le, x =
¡
x1;::: ;xT¢


















Net demands for the private goods and the costs for the provision of the club goods sum
to zero at most. For simplicity, there is no production of private goods. Its inclusion
would be a straightforward extension of the model. Also, club goods are determined
in their nature through the cost function introduced, particularly the way it aggregates
type demands into club demand. Club demand is ful…lled by a production technology
producing private goods only. Indeed, club goods are special by the nature of their
consumption rather than the production technology.
A consumer of type t has an extended utility function Ut : R` £ Rm ! R over
his total private and club good consumption. However, since his initial endowment wt
is …xed, we may simply write Ut(xt;yt). In principle we allow an agent to have short
positions in all commodities.


















whenever nt > 0: (Note that this de…nition anticipates strong monotonicity of uti-







0)t=1;:::;T is called club e¢cient, following Schweizer
(1983).
A feasible club (nt;xt;yt)t=;:::;T is a Lindahl equilibrium if there exist a private
goods price vector p 2 R`






0) = argmax U
t(x
t;y






































By the …rst condition, consumers maximize utility given the market prices for the private
goods and the personal fees for the semi-public goods. The fees cover the costs of the
provision of the club goods by the second condition. The third condition is not always
included: a public administration is in charge of the provision and admission policies,
and as such has the objective to maximize its “pro…ts.” (This maximal pro…t is zero by
the second condition.)
3 A decentralization result
Relatively little is assumed to arrive at complete decentralization of e¢cient clubs
through appropriate price systems. Following Schweizer (1983), positivity of prices is
ensured to render a quasi-equilibrium equilibrium.
Axiom 1 There are two properties that have to be satis…ed.
(a) For every type t = 1;:::;T the utility function Ut is assumed to be continuous,
quasi-concave, and strongly monotonic.
(b) The club good production technology has to be convex in the sense that the cost
function C : RmT
+ ! R`
+ is convex.
In the context of this assumption we have the following result.7
Theorem 1 Any e¢cient club (nt;xt;yt)t=1;::;T with strictly positive endowment,
P
t=1ntwt À 0; can be supported as a Lindahl equilibrium with strictly positive prices.



























In this de…nition we let yt be at location 1 + t.
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¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
n > 0; x 2 R`
+;
y1;::: ;yT 2 Rm
+
)
We remark that also D ½ R`+mT.
Bt is convex by quasi-concavity of Ut for every type t. Consequently, the set B is
convex. To show that D is convex, let (y1;::: ;yT;x;n) and (b y1;::: ;b yT;b x;b n) constitute
(but not be) members of D. De…ne v =
¡
n1y1;::: ;nTyT¢
and b v =
¡
b n1b y1;::: ;b nTb yT¢
.
Then (¡C (v) ¡ x;v) 2 D as well as (¡C (b v) ¡ b x;b v) 2 D.
Now consider ¸ 2 [0;1]. We have to show that there exists a tuple (~ y1;::: ; ~ yT; ~ x; ~ n)
such that (¡C (~ v) ¡ ~ x;~ v) 2 D where ~ v =
¡
~ n1~ y1;::: ; ~ nT ~ yT¢
, ~ v = ¸v + (1 ¡ ¸)b v, and
C (~ v) + ~ x = ¸(C (v) + x) + (1 ¡ ¸)(C (b v) + b x). This can be accomplished by selecting
~ yt = ¸ntyt + (1 ¡ ¸)b ntb yt for every t;e nt = 1; and
~ x = ¸C (v) + (1 ¡ ¸)C (b v) ¡ C (~ v) + ¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)b x:
Now ~ v = ¸v + (1 ¡ ¸)b v and by convexity of the cost function C it follows that
~ x = ¸C (v) + (1 ¡ ¸)C (b v) ¡ C (~ v) + ¸x + (1 ¡ ¸) b x
= C (¸v + (1 ¡ ¸)b v) ¡ C (~ v) + ¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)b x
= ¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)b x:8
Hence, ~ x = 0 and thus indeed (¡C (~ v) ¡ ~ x;~ v) 2 D, …nishing the proof that D is convex.
By e¢ciency of the club (nt
0;xt
0;yt
0)t=1;:::;T, the intersection of B and D is empty.
By the separating hyperplane theorem there exist p 2 R`
+ and p1;::: ;pT 2 Rm
+ not all






In fact, since D is a cone,
(p;p
1;::: ;p
T)B = 0 = (p;p
1;::: ;p
T)D:
Hence, by strong monotonicity of Ut it can be concluded that p;pt = 0. Also, by




0pwt > 0. Thus, there is a type t with nt
0 > 0 and pwt > 0. For this type t an
interior consumption plan is feasible with respect to pxt + ptyt 5 0. Hence, by strong
monotonicity and continuity of Ut, using a standard argument, p À 0 as well as pt À 0.
Hence, by nonzero endowment assumption, pwt > 0 for all t. By the same argument,
all pt À 0. We will now prove that these prices constitute a Lindahl equilibrium.
First, the consumer’s utility maximization condition. Suppose that the tuple given
by (xt;0;::: ;0;yt;0;::: ;0) —with yt at location 1+t —satis…es Ut(xt;yt) > Ut(xt
0;yt
0).
In fact, since pwt > 0 and the utility function is strongly monotonic and continuous,
the same holds for a slightly smaller vector. Using strict positivity of prices, it follows
that B-member (xt;0;::: ;0;yt;0;::: ;0) ful…lls pxt+ptyt > 0. This proves that (xt
0;yt
0)
solves the consumer’s problem.
Second, we consider the …nancial balance condition. By strong monotonicity of the



































0 ) is on the boundary of B, using strong
monotonicity and continuity of the Ut’s. It also belongs to D. Since prices were shown
to separate B and D at zero, the value is zero, yielding …nancial balance.



















This proves that (y1
0;::: ;yT
0 ;n0) indeed solves the public administration’s problem.
This completes the proof of the theorem. ¥
With regard to this equivalence theorem we have the following remarks. Club e¢-
ciency implies that all individual demands for the club goods are equalized, if the
utility functions are strictly quasi-concave. If the population is not replicated, i.e.,
n0 = (1;::: ;1), the …nancial balance condition of Lindahl equilibrium can be simpli…ed
further to
PT
t=1pty0 = py0. Hence, if only one club good is supplied and it is designated
the numerair, then the admission prices or fees sum to unity.
Also we emphasize that the converse of the theorem is true, implying that it is a
true equivalence result. A Lindahl equilibrium is always e¢cient. The proof is an easy
adaptation of Schweizer’s (1983) proof of his theorem 2.
Finally, we remark that the implementation of more general club good cost func-
tions is probably very hard. In the next example we consider a cost function that is
more general, but fails to lead to equivalence of e¢cient clubs and the Lindahl equilibria.
Although semi-public goods, as we de…ned them, are quite general, ranging from purely
private to purely public clubgoods, they have a distinct structure in that only total
consumption by type, y = (n1y1;:::;nTyT) 2 RmT
+ ; a¤ects their provision. In general, a
club with pro…le n and club goods demands y may impose resource requirements in a
way that is not separable by type.
Example Consider an economy setting with one private and one club good, i.e.,
` = m = 1, and two types of consumers, i.e., T = 2; with the following utility functions:
U
1(x;y) = min(2x + 4;y)
U
2(x;y) = min(2x + 3;2y)
Now consider a production structure for the club good that does not satisfy the requi-











This cost function can be interpreted as representing a semi-public good, which provision
is based on the maximal consumption capacity requested, where the maximal capacity
is maxnt:
Consider the club given by n0 = (1;1), x1
0 = x2
0 = ¡1, and y1
0 = y2
0 = 2. This club is
e¢cient, as we demonstrate now.10
We show that U2 cannot be lifted over its club level, 1, whenever n2 > 0;U1 = 2
(its club level), and feasibility. The latter can be written, invoking linear homogeneity




















Hence U2(x2;y2) 5 1 indeed, proving club e¢ciency, and this level is obtained only if










Lindahl pricing by p and substituting the Lindahl break-even constraint for the semi-
public goods, the sum of the consumers’ budgets is zero. Since each of them is nonposi-
tive, they are all zero. Better clubs must be priced higher, hence positive. But this is not
so. Consider any club with n arbitrary, (x1;y1) = (¡1;2) again, but (x2;y2) = (¡1=2;1).
A consumer of type 2 prefers it. This consumption bundle is half the club-e¢cient
bundle, (x2
0;y2
0) = (¡1;2); which has zero value, hence it is a¤ordable. The e¢cient
club cannot be supported by a Lindahl equilibrium.11
4 Discussion
Our theorem provides price support to allocations that cannot be improved upon
by clubs. The prices are linear, unlike Mas-Colell’s (1980) personalized price schedules
(also used by Gilles and Scotchmer, 1997) or Barhamand Wooders’ (1998) admission fees
or “wages.” The theorem and its proof are adaptations of Schweizer’s (1983) theorem
on club e¢cient allocations. He obtains the Henry George Theorem for economies with
…xed public goods and associated inputs and, if the latter are zero, the welfare and core
limit theorems. In the present paper, club goods are not exogenous, but endogenous,
namely the outcome of competition among utility maximizers. Moreover, they are not
purely public, but semi-public.
After all, it is well known that there is no competitive basis for Lindahl equilibria
in pure public goods economies (Milleron, 1972, and Bewley, 1981). Wooders (1978)
has conjectured that the core shrinks when there is crowding, but Conley and Wooders
(1994) show that the second welfare theorem is generally false. Barham and Wooders
(1998) provides useful relationships between optima and competitive equilibria, but all
these papers concern economies with only one private and one public good.
An alternative modelling of an economy with multiple public goods such that the
Lindahl equilibrium emerges, has been undertaken by Vasil’ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth
(1996). That paper uses an alternative core de…nition, with utility levels of members of
blocking coalitions depending on the replica size and the coalition structure. Although
our approach to club goods may seem cleaner, the two approaches are closely related, in
the sense that the opportunity cost of individual public — or club — goods consumption
is not reduced with the size of the economy in either paper. From this perspective the
contribution of our paper is the demonstration that Schweizer’s theorem encompasses
the core limit theorem of Vasil’ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth (1996). The novelty is the
simplicity of the analysis; club e¢ciency is quite a powerful tool. Lindahl equilibria
have a competitive basis in economics with semi-public goods.12
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